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The Medicare Problem: A Solution to Insolvency 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
To he that hath ears, 
Let him hear; he that hath not: 
Medicare Part B 
 
In this demagogues and diplomats agree: a social safety net should 
exist to protect the most vulnerable Americans. Since its     enactment 
in 1965, Medicare has provided such a safety net in the form of a sin-
gle-payer, national health insurance program for     Americans over the 
age of 65.1 In 2016, Medicare comprised 15% of the federal budget—
$678.7 billion—and covered 56.8 million Americans.2 Although health 
care costs remain a major financial strain on the elderly and disabled, 
lawmakers have sought to alleviate that burden through a series of 
Medicare programs. These benefit programs are paid out of trusts 
largely funded by general tax revenue, payroll taxes, and premiums as-
sociated with Medicare plans.3 
Although most current beneficiaries paid into the Medicare trusts 
for years or decades while in the workforce, today’s workers are pres-
ently funding the trusts that pay out today’s benefits, effectively subsi-
dizing the previous generation’s health care.4 Unfortunately, current 
estimates project that one of the trusts that covers a large portion of 
Medicare (the Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund) will become insol-
vent by 2029, potentially collapsing the very program that older Amer-
 
 1. Medicare and Medicaid Milestones, 1937-2015, 1 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS. 9, 2 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History 
/Downloads/Medicare-and-Medicaid-Milestones-1937-2015.pdf.  
 2. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, THE 2017 ANN. REP. OF THE BOARDS OF TRS. OF THE FED. 
HOSP. INS. AND FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS 7 (2017); See also Juliette Cu-
banski & Tricia Neuman, The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (June 22, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/the-facts-on-medicare-
spending-and-financing/. 
 3. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 10. 
 4. Id. at 214; see also Juliette Cubanski et al., A Primer on Medicare: Key Facts About 
the Medicare Program and the People It Covers, 1 KAISER FAM. FOUND. 40, 1 (2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-a-primer-on-medicare-key-facts-about-the-medicare-
program-and-the-people-it-covers. 
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icans have paid into for years and expected would be available for sup-
port and stability as they settle into old age.5 Given the looming insol-
vency of Medicare, saving it will likely require reformation in one way 
or another.6 
One of the primary factors for the projected insolvency is that the 
large demographic of persons born shortly after WWII (commonly 
known as “baby boomers”) have now become, and will continue to be-
come, eligible for Medicare.7 Current estimates of labor force partici-
pation rates project that payroll taxes from the estimated labor force, 
which comprise a large portion of revenue for the trust, will be insuf-
ficient to carry the weight of the influx of new beneficiaries.8 There is 
thus an immediate actuarial problem that requires intensive analysis to 
determine the health of the trust and proposals to correct it. More dif-
ficult still is the political problem of crafting a piece of legislation that 
can “fix” Medicare that can actually pass both chambers of Congress 
for signing into law without being killed by the many “veto-gates” 
available along the way. 
To say that Medicare is a hyper-partisan issue is a gross under-
statement. It is the political equivalent of the Ark of the Covenant, cer-
tain to instantly kill the career of any politician who attempts to steady 
it.9 Americans age fifty-five and older are historically the most reliable 
voting demographic.10 The Medicare issue is volatile, and most law-
makers savvy enough to get elected in the first place understand that 
alienating that demographic by changing their health care is an easy 
way to lose an election. Understandably, current and soon-to-be Med-
icare beneficiaries do not want their premiums raised, their benefits 
reduced, or their taxes increased. After all, beneficiaries did not spend 
their working lives paying into Medicare only to have the trust diluted 




 5. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 7.  
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. Id. at 214. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 2 Samuel 6:6; Tim Reid, Lawmakers Run Scared from Reforming Medicare, REUTERS 
(May 26, 2011, 2:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-debt-medicare-idUSTRE74 
P7PY20110526. 
 10.  Voting in America: A Look at the 2016 Presidential Election, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/05/voting_i 
n_america.html. 
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A viable proposal to fix Medicare must at least feign bipartisanship, 
or perhaps affix a big carrot and a corresponding bigger stick. Since 
Medicare reform would profoundly affect the lives of millions of 
Americans who depend on the program, a proposal should also be as 
generous and gradual as possible while still maintaining the viability of 
the program to not excessively burden beneficiaries. Section III of this 
paper offers in part, such a proposal that could be appended to a more 
comprehensive and robust Medicare reform bill. Passing a controver-
sial, behemothian piece of health care legislation may seem impossible, 
but recycling some of the tactics used to pass the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) discussed below can serve as a model 
in some respects going forward. 
II.  THE PROBLEM 
To any problem, 
A due solution follows. 
Alas! Medicare! 
 
Understanding Medicare’s solvency problem first requires a sense 
of its sources of revenue and costs. Like many government programs, 
revenue and costs for Medicare Part A are variable. For example, rev-
enue for the program may fluctuate with taxes that the federal govern-
ment receives from payroll, which also fluctuates depending on wages 
and labor participation. Costs likewise fluctuate due to health care 
prices, enrollment and enrollment rates, and mortality rates. Addition-
ally, both costs and revenue are dependent on changing statutes and 
regulation. As laws change, Medicare’s viability may be strengthened 
or weakened. Regardless, reports from government agencies on the fu-
ture viability of Medicare rest on certain assumptions in contempora-
neous law. When any of those laws are changed, the analysis must be 
revised to account for the changes. This section also demonstrates how 
changes to those assumptions in health care law may have a profound 
impact on the viability of Medicare. 
A.  Sources of Revenue 
The Boards of Trustees (the Trustees) of the Federal Hospital In-
surance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds 
released an annual report (the Report) in 2017 on the financial status 
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of the trusts.11 According to the Trustees, the Hospital Insurance (HI) 
trust fund is estimated to be depleted in 2029 according to intermedi-
ate health care cost models, meaning that expenditures will have ex-
ceeded revenue long enough to exhaust all assets within the trust.12 
Medicare is funded by two separate trusts, namely the HI trust fund 
and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund, which the 
Trustees project will remain in financial balance for the foreseeable 
future.13 The SMI trust fund covers Parts B and D of Medicare.14 Part 
B covers costs associated with physicians, outpatient hospital treat-
ment, and home health services while Part D covers prescription 
drugs.15 The HI trust fund (the trust estimated to deplete in 2029), 
however, covers Part A of Medicare, which helps pay for costs associ-
ated with hospital stays, home health services following hospital stays, 
skilled nursing facilities, and hospice care.16 While the financial out-
look for the SMI trust fund is good, the outlook for the HI trust fund 
is not, and this is where the Medicare problem can be isolated for in-
spection. In 2016, Medicare Part A, which is entirely funded by the HI 
trust fund, accounted for $285.4 billion of the $678 billion of total 
Medicare expenditures.17 In other words, the HI trust fund, which is 
in jeopardy, covers a little more than 40% of Medicare in its entirety. 
Due to the differences in nature between Part A and Parts B and 
D, not only are the revenue sources for the HI trust fund and SMI trust 
fund different, but legal mechanisms exist to ensure that Parts B and 
D are sufficiently covered for each fiscal year.18 The nature of Part A 
simply does not accommodate the existence of such mechanisms, 
which is a major cause for alarm for the HI trust fund. Part A or the 
HI trust fund (which total revenue in 2016 was $290.8 billion) is 
funded primarily by payroll taxes (87.2% of total HI trust fund reve-
nue), interest on trust assets (2.6%), taxation on social security benefits 
(8%), premiums (1.1%), and general revenue, which is money from 
the U.S. Treasury (.4%).19 In contrast, Parts B and D (which total rev-
enue for 2016 was a combined $419.4 billion) do not receive revenue 
 
 11. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. at 7. 
 13. Id. at 34. 
 14. Id. at 1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 10. 
 18. Id. at 31. 
 19. Id. at 10. 
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from payroll taxes or taxation on social security.20 Rather, they are al-
most entirely funded by U.S. Treasury general revenue (75.8% of total 
SMI trust fund revenue) and premiums (20.5%).21 
The differences in nature discussed earlier which provide for the 
different sources of revenue for the HI trust fund and the SMI trust 
fund rise in part from the fact that Parts B and D of Medicare are vol-
untary programs, while Part A is generally compulsory.22 This neces-
sarily means that Parts B and D will receive larger portions of revenue 
from premiums since beneficiaries of those Parts volunteer to pay a 
monthly premium.23 Moreover, the legal mechanisms discussed earlier 
require that transfers from general revenue sufficiently cover the fol-
lowing year’s estimated expenditures for Parts B and D.24 Whereas 
payroll taxes are the primary source of revenue for Part A, Parts B and 
D are budgeted many years earlier. And because many Part A factors—
such as future wages, labor participation rates, and death rates—are 
more difficult to predict many years in advance, budgeting Part A out 
of the general revenue is less practicable.25 Furthermore, tax rates on 
employees and employers are not adjusted annually to meet the de-
mands of the HI trust fund.26 
However, while uncertainty plagues the HI trust fund, the Trus-
tees are not completely without projections and tools for analysis    to 
determine the future stability of Medicare. Estimates on enrollee rates, 
labor force participation rates, wages, and payment restrictions in the 
ACA were factors in assessing the future adequacy   of Medicare. 
B.  Enrollment and Labor Participation 
“Baby boomers” or “boomers” are those persons born during the 
period immediately following WWII through the mid-1960s.27 Since 
Boomers were born between the years 1945 and 1965, and the age of 
eligibility for Medicare is sixty-five years, Boomers began enrolling in 
Medicare in 2010 and will continue to do so through 2030. The 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 31. 
 23. Cubanski et al., supra note 4, at 2. 
 24. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 31. 
 25. Id. at 31, 12. 
 26. Id. at 18. 
 27. Id. at 64. 
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Boomer population peaked in the early 2000s at over seventy-five mil-
lion and began to taper off shortly thereafter. But by 2029, 20% of the 
total U.S. population will be over the age of sixty-five,  and therefore 
eligible for Medicare.28 In 2000, approximately thirty-nine million 
Americans were enrolled in Medicare, and by 2030 (the year after HI 
trust fund depletion), intermediate projections of enrollment will sur-
pass eighty million, more than double the enrollment from 2000.29 
Making matters worse, the average per beneficiary cost (ABC) is 
likewise expected to rise, compounding the enrollment issue.30 In 
2000, the ABC of Part A alone was $3383, and by 2025, intermediate 
projections will reach $6735, more than double the ABC from 2000.31 
Within the next twelve years, the number of enrollees will also double 
for Part A. Additionally, in the next seven years, the ABC will also dou-
ble. And while the HI trust fund enjoyed a net positive change in trust 
assets in 2016, intermediate cost estimates project that that trend will 
only last until 2022. Beginning in 2023, the net changes in assets is 
expected to become negative, and more so each subsequent year until 
the trust is completely depleted six years later in 2029.32 This means 
that in 2029, the HI trust fund will not be able to cover all of its obli-
gations to Part A.33 Instead, it will only be able to meet 88% of its 
payments, and even less in subsequent years.34 The HI trust fund’s pre-
dicted inability to meet its payment obligations is directly due to the 
unprecedented growth of enrollees, spikes in ABC, and estimates of 
increased life expectancy. And because Part  
A is mostly funded by payroll taxes, the program will be unable to meet 
the higher demand since35 current and projected labor participation 
rates, wages, and payroll tax revenue will simply not be enough to carry 
the costs beyond 2029.36 
 
 
 28. Sandra L. Colby & Jennifer M. Ortman, The Baby Boom Cohort in the United States: 
2012 to 2060, 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 16, 1 (2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p
25-1141.pdf. 
 29. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 183. 
 30. Id. at 197. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 54. 
 33. Id. at 41. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 214. 
 36. Id. at 62.  
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Between 2005 and 2016 (dates coinciding with the Great Reces-
sion), the ABC was higher than income rates. That makes sense be-
cause lower employment rates and wages during the recession reduced 
taxable income, which in turn put a financial strain on the HI trust 
fund.37 However, economists generally agree that in 2017 the economy 
took a turn for the better, and income rates surpassed cost rates for the 
first time in over a decade.38 Even as the economy steadily improves, it 
will fall woefully short of the rate that boomers are expected to enroll 
in Part A.39 In fact, intermediate estimates show that while income 
rates will exceed cost rates for a few more years, 2021 will be the first 
year income rates will again fall behind cost rates, and the gap between 
rates will only grow larger for the foreseeable future.40 
While many economists predict that employment rates and  wages 
are expected to rise during the post-recession recovery, the labor and 
wage growth rates will be outpaced by the HI trust fund demands as 
more boomers reach the age of eligibility for Medicare with corre-
sponding higher ABC levels. From 1980 and 2008, there were roughly 
four workers per each beneficiary.41 For example, the average labor 
force in 2000 was 141 million, while the number of beneficiaries was 
39.9 million, allowing for roughly 3.5 workers per beneficiary.42 By 
2030, however, the workers per beneficiary will decline to 2.4 and con-
stantly decrease thereafter to 2.1 in 2091, which is how far the         
Trustees’ projections extend.43 This is in large part due to the fact that 
as boomers age and the labor force gets older, the overall participation 
rate is expected to drop to 61% in 2026 from its peak of 67.1%               
in 2000.44 
 
 37. Id. at 64. 
 38. Id. at 62. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 64. 
 42. Mita Toossi, A Century of Change: The U.S. Labor Force, 1950-2050, 15 MONTHLY 
LAB. REV. 28, 15 (2002), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/05/art2full.pdf; Medicare 2000: 35 
Years of Improving Americans’ Health and Security, 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN. 60, 
12 (July 2000), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/TheChartSeries/downloads/35chartbk.pdf. 
 43. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 65. 
 44. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., USDL-17-1429, EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS – 2016–26 
(2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf. 
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C.  Assumptions and the Affordable Care Act 
Although the nature of Part A makes for greater uncertainty with 
respect to projections and funding, the Trustees are not completely 
without some foresight regarding the future financial status of the HI 
trust fund. Using high cost, low cost, and intermediate cost assumption 
models, the Trustees estimated that the HI trust fund will eventually 
be depleted and only able to pay a portion of its obligations. Using the 
intermediate assumptions model, the Trustees estimated that the HI 
trust fund will be depleted in 2029 when it will only be able to pay 88% 
of its obligations to Part A.45 Under high cost assumptions, the Trus-
tees estimated that the HI trust fund would be depleted much earlier 
in 2023.46 The intermediate model relied on several assumptions about 
economic growth and advances in treatments allowing for lower health 
care costs. Additionally, it relied on the ACA remaining unchanged, 
which includes 165 provisions that affect Medicare.47 
Unfortunately, since July 2017, when the Report was released, the 
115th Congress, together with the Trump administration, have elimi-
nated or undercut many of the assumptions that the Trustees relied on 
for their analysis. While it is uncertain how these changes will affect 
Medicare and more specifically the HI trust fund, it is reasonable to 
assume that without many of the protections put in place to reduce 
Part A costs, the reality of the HI trust fund’s future may   be closer to 
the high cost assumption model today than the intermediate one. 
Perhaps the most glaring change is the cut of payroll taxes (the 
primary source of funding for the HI trust fund) enacted in the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA).48 Although Congress was fully  cog-
nizant of the financial troubles relating to Medicare, its tax plan will 
not alleviate those troubles but rather exacerbate them by reducing the 
amount of taxable wages from payrolls, thus decreasing the primary 
source of revenue for the HI trust fund.49 However, due to the com-
plexity of the TCJA, economists are unsure when certain provisions 
 
 45. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 29. 
 46. Id. at 27. 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. Frank Sammartino et al., The Effect of the TCJA Individual Income Tax Provisions 
Across Income Groups and Across the States, TAX POLICY CENTER (Mar. 28, 2018), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/154006/the_effect_of_the_tcja_in 
dividual_income_tax_provisions_across_income_groups_and_across_the_states.pdf. 
 49. See the “Letter of Transmittal” page, of the Trustee’s annual report, specifically ad-
dressing Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, and the President of the Senate. OFF. OF THE 
ACTUARY, supra note 2. John Wasik, How GOP Tax Bill Will Blow Up Medicare, FORBES (Dec. 
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will take effect. Therefore, the exact immediate or long-term effects 
on Medicare are uncertain at this time.50 Regardless of when or how 
the TCJA will begin to affect Medicare, a reasonable inference is that 
it will harm the current financial status of the HI trust fund. 
Additionally, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (2018 Budget) re-
pealed the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), which was 
created by the ACA.51 The IPAB was tasked with submitting proposals 
to Congress aimed at extending the solvency of Medicare, slowing 
Medicare costs, and improving the quality of care for Medicare bene-
ficiaries.52 Since 2013, the Chief Actuary at the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) was required to determine the target 
rate and the projected growth rate in Medicare per-capita spending.53 
If in any year the Chief Actuary found that the projected growth rate 
exceeded the target rate, the Chief would be required to establish a 
savings target rate for that year, and IPAB in turn would submit a pro-
posal to the President to meet that savings target rate.54 Since 2013, 
however, the Medicare per capita growth rate has never exceeded the 
target growth rate, so IPAB was never required to submit any such 
proposal to the President.55 But that did not stop IPAB from drawing 
ire from Republicans who argued that IPAB, which was not subject to 
judicial, congressional, or administrative review, was too powerful. 
IPAB could independently recommend certain cuts to Medicare, lead-
ing some people to call it a “death   panel.”56 Although IPAB was never 
actually triggered, some critics felt it was “better to kill the monster 
before it ever [saw] the light of day.”57 
 
1, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2017/12/01/how-gop-tax-bill-will-
blow-up-medicare/#53a3ab334deb.  
 50. John Patrick Pullen, President Trump Has Signed the GOP Tax Bill. Here’s When 
Cuts Will Start, FORTUNE (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:18 PM), http://fortune.com/2017/12/20/gop-tax-bill-
cuts-start/. 
 51. H.R. Con. Res. 1892, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted). 
 52. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 178. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Glenn Kessler, Sarah Palin, ‘Death Panels’ and ‘Obamacare,’ WASH. POST (June 27, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/sarah-palin-death-panels-and-
obamacare/2012/06/27/gJQAysUP7V_blog.html?utm_term=.c4a9a8b3f753; Phil Roe, It’s Time 
to Repeal the IPAB, HOUSE REPUBLICANS (June 23, 2015), https://www.gop.gov/its-time-to-
repeal-the-ipab/. 
 57. David Blumenthal & David Squires, IPAB: Ditching the Dog that Didn’t Bark, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blo
g/2015/jan/ipab-ditching-the-dog. 
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Had IPAB remained in place, however, it would likely have been 
triggered for the first time in 2021, when the Medicare projected 
growth rate is expected to exceed the target rate for one year.58 The 
growth rate in 2022 and 2023 will slow down behind the target rate, 
but will again outpace the target rate in 2024, and will remain ahead 
until the end the of the Trustees’ projections.59 So while conservative 
budget-hawks would normally celebrate the kind of cuts to govern-
ment programs that would be recommended by something like IPAB, 
they are prone to loathe them under a different name: Obamacare. 
With the “death panel” now dead, it is unclear how the elimination of 
IPAB, which the Trustees assumed would remain, will affect the short-
term status of the HI trust fund or the estimated date of depletion.60 
Yet another major change that the Trustees did not anticipate 
when conducting their analysis is the de facto repeal of the ACA’s   in-
dividual mandate in the TCJA signed into law in December of 2017, 
five months after the release of the Report.61 The individual mandate 
was a penalty of $695 to each person (or 2.5% of one’s household in-
come, whichever is more) without qualifying health coverage.62 With-
out enough support in Congress to repeal the ACA and its individual 
mandate, Congress and the Trump administration instead reduced the 
penalty to $0, opting to undermine the ACA instead.63 In 2016, ap-
proximately 6.5 million Americans paid the penalty, resulting in ap-
proximately $3 billion collected by the IRS.64 The lack of revenue from 
the penalty will invariably exacerbate the deficits in the federal budget 
(not including the $1.5 trillion deficit the TCJA is expected to create 
on its own).65 The exact manner in which the repeal of the individual 
mandate and the new tax code at large will affect both Medicare trust 
funds is presently unclear, but it stands to reason that less general rev-
enue will not improve the adequacy of the HI trust fund or the SMI 
trust fund, but will instead weaken them. 
 
 58. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 179. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 5-6. 
 61. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017). 
 62. Penalty, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/penalty/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 63. § 11081. 
 64. Letter from John Koskinen, IRS Commissioner, to members of Congress (Jan. 9, 
2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/commissionerletteracafilingseason.pdf.  
 65. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-66-17, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
“TAX CUT AND JOBS ACT” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON NOVEMBER 
16, 2017 2 (2017). 
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Another assumption the Trustees relied on for the 161 ACA pro-
visions affecting Medicare is cost-sharing reductions (CSRs), an ACA 
provision that no longer has teeth.66 Cost-sharing basically represents 
the relationship between the insured and the insurer. The insured is 
obligated to pay a certain portion of the medical claim (in the form of 
co-pays, deductibles, and premiums) depending on the insurance plan, 
and the insurer pays the other part, thus the cost is shared between the 
two parties. The ACA implemented CSRs in order to reduce or place 
annual out-of-pocket limits on insurance companies that capped con-
sumer cost-sharing on certain plans.67 Understanding that a burden 
would be placed on insurance companies by limiting how much they 
could charge insureds, the ACA provided for subsidies to ease             
that  burden.68 
Subsidies to health insurance companies were always a controver-
sial issue of the ACA and were often vilified as “Obamacare bailouts.”69 
But since the Republican-controlled Congress and White House could 
not gather enough support to repeal the ACA wholesale, the Congress 
passed a $1.3 trillion omnibus bill that undercut CSRs, which Presi-
dent Trump signed into law on March 23, 2018.70 Of the $1.3 trillion 
package, $88 billion went to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (the agency charged with paying out the subsidies to insurance 
companies).71 But despite lobbying efforts by a coalition of health care  
providers, such as the American Medical Association and Blue Cross  
 
 
 66. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 188. 
 67. Jane Sung et al., Health Insurance Cost-Sharing Reductions Are Critical to Ensuring 
Affordable Health Care for Older Adults, AARP (Sept. 2017), https://www.aarp.org/con-
tent/dam/aarp/ppi/2017/09/csr-fact-sheet.pdf. 
 68. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 18001, §1342 (2010). 
 69. Glenn Kessler, President Trump’s Claim of Obamacare ‘Bailouts’ for Insurance Com-
panies, WASH. POST(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2 
017/08/07/president-trumps-claim-of-obamacare-bailouts-for-insurance-companies/.  
 70. John Wagner & Mike DeBonis, Trump Signs $1.3 Trillion Spending Bill Despite 
Veto Threat on Twitter, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/post-politics/wp/2018/03/23/trump-threatens-to-veto-omnibus-bill-because-it-does-not-ad-
dress-daca-recipients/?utm_term=.8a694e873d87; Glenn Kessler, President Trump’s Claim of 
Obamacare ‘Bailouts’ for Insurance Companies, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/08/07/president-trumps-claim-of-obamacare-
bailouts-for-insurance-companies/.  
 71. Susannah Luthi, Insurance Market Stabilization Out: A Look at Congress’ Spending 
Omnibus, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:00 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/ 
article/20180321/NEWS/180329973/insurance-market-stabilization-out-a-look-at-congress-
spending. 
OSCAR, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  5:29 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
366 
Blue Shield Association, to include appropriations in the Omnibus bill 
for CSRs, none of the $88 billion was appropriated for such.72 
Although Medicare Part A costs are not eligible for CSRs, under-
cutting §1342 of the ACA by appropriating no money for it does have 
an effect. Part B and D beneficiaries are eligible for CSRs, and while 
Parts B and D are funded by the SMI trust fund, over 92% of Part A 
beneficiaries are also enrolled in Part B.73 This means that although 
funding for Parts A and B come from different trusts, many Part A 
beneficiaries will likely be harmed by the lack of appropriations for 
CSRs because of the rising costs of their Parts B and D co-pays, de-
ductibles, or premiums. The Medicare problem is not only an actuarial 
one; the problem is that real Americans may soon face lower quality of 
health care at higher costs if immediate legislative actions are not taken 
to ameliorate what could be an approaching health care crisis. The 
Trustees caution that “prompt legislative action” is necessary to 
achieve financial adequacy of the HI trust fund, and the opinion of the 
Actuary goes further saying: 
Absent an unprecedented change in health care delivery systems and 
payment mechanisms, the prices paid by Medicare for most health 
services will fall increasingly short of the cost of providing such ser-
vices. If this issue is not addressed by subsequent legislation, it is 
likely that access to, and quality of, Medicare benefits would deteri-
orate over time for beneficiaries.74 
Unfortunately, proposals without precedent rarely garner the po-
litical support necessary to become law. Equally as unfortunate is the 
deterioration of quality and access to Medicare benefits that are pre-
dicted to follow the inability or unwillingness to make those changes 






 72. Id.; Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and various hospital associations to 
Congress (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Coalition-Market-
Stability-Letter-03.06.2018.pdf. 
 73. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 183. 
 74. Id. at 256. 
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III.  THE PROPOSAL, THE POLITICS, AND THE PLAN 
What battle is this? 
The elephant and the ass; 
Ever symbionts. 
 
Any proposal should consider both the policies within it and the 
politics surrounding it. This paper posits two Medicare cost reduction 
models that would allow the Medicare to remain solvent into the fore-
seeable future. Additional options to extend the life of Medicare such 
as raising taxes and raising the age of eligibility are excluded for the 
purposes of this paper, though very valuable in a comprehensive and 
functional Medicare reform package. Bills that propose any cuts to 
Medicare benefits are met with fierce opposition and are usually dead 
on arrival. This proposal is designed to overcome the political hurdle 
of Medicare cuts by expanding benefits first before cuts eventually go 
into effect. But successful legislation requires deft navigation of both 
the Congress and constituents. The ACA was sold on a message sim-
ultaneously tailored to both politicians and the body politic, and this 
proposal will adopt some of the same means. 
A.  The Proposal 
The Trustees call for “substantial steps” to address Medicare’s, or 
rather the HI trust’s, financial problems.75 They recommend that 
“Congress and the executive branch work closely together with a sense 
of urgency to address the depletion of the HI trust fund and the pro-
jected growth in HI (Part A) . . . expenditures.”76 They also comment 
that “[t]he sooner solutions are enacted, the more flexible and gradual 
they can be.”77 Since the HI trust fund’s financial status fails the Trus-
tee’s short-term test by depleting in 2029, the options for flexibility are 
substantially reduced, requiring substantial steps indeed.78 The follow-
ing proposal to extend Medicare’s solvency posited in this paper is ag-
gressive, but necessary for maintaining the long term viability of the 
HI trust fund for the nearly eighty-one million Americans expected to 
 
 75. Id. at 9. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 40. 
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be enrolled in Medicare Part A by 2030.79 By that point, the HI trust 
fund is estimated to only be able to meet   88% of its liabilities (an $85 
billion deficit) in 2029, or in other words, insolvent.80 
Note that the proposal below includes no provisions for increases 
in payroll taxes or increases in age eligibility, both of which are com-
mon suggestions to addressing the Medicare problem. Although these 
provisions would be very beneficial, and are explicitly suggested by the 
Trustees, this proposal aims to show how actuarial balance can be 
achieved solely through ABC reductions using either of two unique 
graduated benefit reduction models described below.81 Therefore, 
readers should assess this proposal in vacuum, understanding that ad-
ditional measures such as raising payroll taxes would only help to ame-
liorate what may seem to some to be excessively sharp reductions to 
current or soon-to-be beneficiaries. In other words, this proposal is 
intended to be an honest, starting bargaining position to be appended 
to a more comprehensive and robust Medicare reform bill that can re-
ceive bipartisan support to the extent necessary to pass both chambers 







 79. Id. at 41, 183.  
 80. Id. at 41, 183. $85.5 billion deficit estimated by using assets at the beginning of 2029 
and total HI trust fund expenditures for that year and solving for the difference between the total 
expenditures and 88% of those expenditures. 
 81. Id. at 66, n.38. 
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As discussed previously, the HI trust fund is estimated to be de-
pleted in 2029 using an intermediate (as opposed to high cost or low 
cost) assumption model.82 The Report gives valuable information in-
cluding the estimated total incomes and total expenditures for the HI 
trust fund through the year 2026 along with enrollment estimates.83 
However, the values for income, expenditures, and enrollment for the 
last three years leading to depletion (2027, 2028, and 2029) are omitted 
from the Report.84 Identifying or solving for the values for these years 
is crucial to creating a viable short-term solvency proposal, since the 
proposal should gradually reduce expenses so that the trust can meet 
100% of its obligations in 2029 and into the future. Fortunately, accu-
rate estimates for these can be extrapolated using an algebraic differ-
ence table, and the following proposal will use these estimates. 
It is import here to briefly explain the methodology used to arrive 
at the estimated values in order to ensure accuracy in the extrapolations 
and the integrity of the proposal. For example, Table V.B4. – Medicare 
Enrollment of the Report gives historical values for Part A enrollment 
from 1970 to 2016.85 It goes on to provide intermediate estimates for 
2017 to 2026, where upon the enrollment values for 2027, 2028, and 
2029 are omitted, but values are again provided for 2030 and for every 
fifth year thereafter (i.e. 2035, 2040, 2045, and so on) until 2091.86 
Therefore, using an algebraic difference table, the increase in enroll-
ment for each subsequent year after 2026 can be solved for 1.995%. 
The increase is multiplied by the provided enrollment estimate in 2026 
and the product is again multiplied by the increase (1.995%). When 
repeated for 2027 through 2030, the extrapolated values for enroll-
ment for 2027 to 2030 are (in thousands) 76,214, 77,734, 79,285, and 
80,866, respectively. Since the Report itself provides the value of en-
rollment for 2030, which is indeed 80,866, the calculations are relia-
ble.87 The same methodology was used to extrapolate ABC, and total 





 82. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 10. 
 83. Id. at 54, 57, 188. 
 84. Id. at 54. 
 85. Id. at 183. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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expenditures is simply the number of beneficiaries or enrollees multi-
plied by the ABC. Therefore, total HI trust fund expenditures during 
2019 to 2029 absent any legislative changes can be accurately estimated 
at $5.31 trillion. 
 
Note that extrapolating HI trust fund revenue for 2027 to 2029 is 
not necessary for this proposal, because by recognizing that the HI 
trust fund balance at the end of 2029 is $-85.8 billion, the exact in-
comes and trust fund balances at the end of 2027 and 2028 matter little. 
It is enough to assume that the end of year balances for 2027 and 2028 
are gradually reduced at an unspecified rate, but remain positive (since 
the HI trust fund can cover 100% of the costs of Part A as late as 2028) 
before the HI trust fund balance first becomes negative in 2029 and is 
only able to pay 88% of its obligations.88 
Any viable proposal should attempt to meet 100% of HI’s Part A 
obligations in 2029 by producing a positive end-of-year trust fund bal-
ance and by steadily increasing the trust’s end of year balance each 
subsequent year in order to maintain long-term adequacy, stability, 
and longevity. According to the intermediate estimates, at the time of 
this writing, eleven years remain until insolvency. Therefore, the pro-
posal below spans eleven years. The flexibility that lawmakers have to 
soften cuts to Medicare is reduced every year that no action is taken. 
 
 88. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 29. 
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And since $5.31 trillion within eleven years is all the flexibility that is 
available, the substantial steps necessary to meet the goal may be, by 
necessity, less gradual than what is desirable or comfortable. However, 
those steps should be as gradual as possible so as to not place too heavy 
a burden on current and soon-to-be Part A beneficiaries. 
Table V.D1. – HI trust fund and SMI trust fund Average Incurred 
per Beneficiary Costs in the Report provides estimates for HI trust 
fund (or Part A) ABC from 2017 to 2026.89 Only the years 2019 to 
2029 are relevant to this proposal. As discussed above, the Report does 
not provide estimates for 2027, 2028, and 2029, and an algebraic dif-
ference table estimated that, if left unchanged, the ABC for those years 
will be $7634, $8245, and $8987, respectively. Multiplying these values 
by projected enrollments for the corresponding years results in massive 
deficits, with HI trust fund assets depleted in 2029 and only able to pay 
88% of its obligations to Part A.90 This proposal therefore recom-
mends gradual legislative limits on ABC for the short-term period. 
The current pay-as-you-go system requires that payroll taxes from 
today’s workers provide the benefits for today’s beneficiaries.91 The 
Trustees note that the HI trust fund actuarial balance could be reached 
by reducing Part A benefits by 14% each year if the reductions are 
implemented immediately.92 However, an immediate reduction in 
Medicare benefits would not be well received by the Medicare com-
munity to put it mildly and would also have no chance of passing Con-
gress. Therefore, this eleven-year proposal provides two graduated 
models in which ABC is immediately expanded in 2019 and gradually 
reduced each year thereafter until 2029. Both models would achieve 
actuarial balance, but they graduate at different rates. For example, 
Model A expands ABC to a greater extent than Model B, but this 
means that in order to achieve actuarial balance, the negative slope in 
ABC is also greater with Model A in order make up for the larger initial 
expansion. Model A would appeal more to the older Medicare benefi-
ciary population because they would enjoy greater benefits immedi-
ately (accounting for the fact that generally, the older one is, the less 
time one has left to live); meanwhile, Model B would appeal more to 
the younger Medicare beneficiary population, or those who are within 
eleven years of reaching the age of eligibility. 
 
 89. Id. at 197. 
 90. Id. at 29. 
 91. Id. at 214. 
 92. Id. at 66, n.38. 
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1.  Model A 
The Report provides that in 2019, ABC is $5326 (the base).93 
Model A proposes that ABC be raised by mandate to $8072 for 2019. 
This value was reached by solving for the difference between $8987 
(the extrapolated ABC for 2029 if left unchanged) and the base, which 
is $3661, and multiplying that difference by 75%, producing $2746 
(the bump). The sum of the base and the bump is $8072, which is the 
mandated ABC for 2019. Seventy-five percent is the optimal multiplier 
because it allows for the greatest expansion of benefits while still 
achieving actuarial balance when following the prescribed graduation 
of Model A. Mandated ABC limits for subsequent years would allot 
9/10 of the $2746 bump in addition to the base in 2020, then 8/10 in 
2021, 7/10 in 2021, and so on (i.e. $7797 in 2020 and $7523 in 2021) 
until ABC would bottom out in 2029, receiving the base amount only. 
This model would result in $5.1725 trillion in total HI trust fund ex-
penditures, saving $133.4 billion over the short-term period compared 
to operations if left unchanged.94 The savings would provide for a 


















 93. Id. at 197. 
 94. $133.4 billion savings calculated by subtracting total expenditures in Model A from 
total expenditures as presently estimated. 
 95. $47.9 billion end-of-year surplus calculated by adding $133.4 billion to the estimated 
2029 deficit (-$85.5 billion). 
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Under Model A, beneficiaries would receive a net increase of 
$2746 of benefits in 2019 and $2471 in 2020, gradually reducing ABC 
until 2025 when beneficiaries would begin to see a net decrease in ben-
efits ($-311) when compared to ABC levels absent any changes. The 
net decreases or difference in benefits when compared to current op-
erations would grow larger each subsequent year. The benefit to cur-
rent beneficiaries is that they would receive a net increase of $8845 
between 2019 and 2024, before seeing reductions in 2025 compared to 
current operations. The downside is that the      latter part of the short-
term period for Model A would see sharp reductions to make up for 
the large expansion during the former years. For example, beneficiaries 
reaching the age of eligibility in 2029 would see an ABC reduction of 
$33,661 were Medicare left unchanged. Remember, however, that if 
left unchanged, only 88% of payments can be made, so it is probable 
that beneficiaries would not see the full estimated $8987 in                  
2029 anyway.96 
2.  Model B 
Model B is designed to reduce the rate of the negative slope of the 
ABC when compared to Model A by not expanding benefits to the ex-
tent of model A in 2019. Model B proposes that ABC be raised by 
mandate to $7047 in 2019. This value was reached by multiplying the 
 
 96. OFF. OF THE ACTUARY, supra note 2, at 29. 
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base by 47% instead of 75%. Forty-seven percent is the optimal mul-
tiplier in this case because it too allows for the greatest expansion of 
benefits while still achieving actuarial balance when following the pre-
scribed graduation of Model B. Under this model, current beneficiar-
ies would receive a lesser bump of $1721 in addition to the base, total-
ing $7047 in 2019. The difference in graduation between Models A 
and B is that instead of reducing the bump by 1/10 ever year, the 1/10 
reduction would occur every other year. For example, in 2019 and 
2020 beneficiaries would receive the full bump, totaling $7157. There-
after, beneficiaries in both 2021 and 2022 would receive 9/10 of the 
bump, and beneficiaries in both 2023 and 2024 would receive 8/10 of 
the bump, and so on until beneficiaries would receive 5/10 of the bump 
in 2029. 
Model B would cost $5.1753 trillion over the short-term period, 
saving $130.6 billion, leaving a surplus of $45.1 billion in the HI trust 
fund after rounding.97 As the figures demonstrate, Model B may be less 
appealing to the older Medicare population because the initial expan-
sion is diluted. However, it is a softer burden on the younger popula-
tion who would not see so rapid a decline in ABC. Current beneficiar-
ies would see a net increase of $5782 in the first six years when 
compared to current operations, as opposed to $8845 net increase in 
model A during the years 2019 to 2024, after which in 2025 beneficiar-
















 97. $130.6 billion savings calculated by subtracting total expenditures in Model B from 
total expenditures as presently estimated. $45.1 billion end of year surplus calculated by adding 
$130.6 billion to the estimated 2029 deficit (-$85.5 billion). 
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Although both models achieve actuarial balance, each raise differ-
ent political incentives or disincentives depending on what would ap-
peal more to voters: a more aggressive model that more generously 
expands benefits immediately with greater reductions in the latter part 
of the short-term period, or a moderate model with a more modest 
initial expansion of benefits allowing for a softer reduction in benefits 
over the same period. It would be up to Congress to decide which 
model would be more favorable to their constituents. 
B.  The Politics 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to entitlement, or more specifically to 
Medicare reform, is the argument from political opponents who claim 
that any proposals to reduce benefits for Medicare beneficiaries is 
cruel, since current beneficiaries have paid into the program by partic-
ipating in the labor force for decades. It would be heartless to deprive 
senior Americans of the health care coverage they so desperately re-
quire and at a time in their lives when they are most vulnerable. The 
power of this argument must not be underestimated. It commands re-
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spect, especially since Americans over the age of fifty-five have histor-
ically been the most active voting population.98 So anyone who pro-
poses to harm them by reducing their benefits in any form or fashion 
will be answered with a swift wallop from a cane, figuratively or other-
wise. Politicians know this and it is likely a contributing factor to why 
the Medicare problem has been allowed to reach the point of potential 
jeopardy. The simplest explanation is that candidates who propose 
changes to Medicare do not generally win elections. 
Cuts to government programs, whether they be to Medicaid, Med-
icare, Social Security, or the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Pro-
gram (or food stamps) almost universally come from the right, or the 
Republican aisle of Congress. Republicans have historically carried the 
flag of fiscal conservatism, at least theatrically if not in practice. Efforts 
by Republicans to reform entitlements have existed since their enact-
ments. Entitlement reform is commonly understood to be something 
of a white whale for House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI), who has 
worked to pass such reform during his two decades in Congress to no 
avail.99 A progressive PAC went so far as to make a video depicting 
Ryan wheeling an old woman off a cliff with captions that read, “Is 
America Beautiful without Medicare?”100 While the advertisement is 
hyperbolic, it illustrates the point that largely Democrats and not many 
Americans have an appetite for Medicare reform. 
Reformation proposals have lived and died even with safeguards in 
place to protect current and soon-to-be beneficiaries by grandfather-
ing them in and shielding them from any potential changes. For exam-
ple, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) in defense of such a proposal said, 
“my mother depends on Medicare and Social Security. I will never 
support anything that would hurt my mother or retirees like her.”101 
Still, these safeguards are not enough because Medicare reform is too 
easily wielded as a club to beat the candidate who proposes it, even 
with safeguards in place. Even for those candidates who may genuinely 
believe that something must be done, the opportunity to attack their 
opponents as heartless or unfeeling in return for a bump in the polls 
 
 98. Voting in America: A Look at the 2016 Presidential Election, supra note 10. 
 99. CNBC Transcript: House Speaker Paul Ryan Speaks with “Squawk Box” Today, 
CNBC (Apr. 17, 2018, 10:08 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/17/cnbc-transcript-house-
speaker-paul-ryan-speaks-with-squawk-box-today.html.  
 100. The Agenda Project Action Fund, Granny Off the Cliff, YOUTUBE (May 17, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGnE83A1Z4U. 
 101. Rubio Proposes Retirement Security Reforms at National Press Club (C-SPAN tele-
vision broadcast May 13, 2014). 
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or perhaps even securing a win is too tempting. Like many of the most 
difficult problems in America, many politicians have found that the 
best policy involving a substantial problem is simply to ignore it. 
This is where the proposal posited in this paper diverges from pre-
vious proposals. Since benefits initially increase as opposed to decrease, 
the powerful argument against reducing benefits suddenly loses several 
terawatts. The proposal naturally turns the argument (and the arguer) 
on its head since the proposal mandates that benefits be expanded im-
mediately for current beneficiaries who are struggling now, while giv-
ing prospective beneficiaries an opportunity to plan for the future. Af-
ter all, the average retired couple will pay approximately $280,000 in 
medical bills, contributing to medical related bankruptcy cases for re-
tirees filed each year.102 In that regard, it would seem more heartless 
still to deny immediate expansion of benefits for senior Americans who 
need them now more than ever. 
Remember that this proposal is submitted in a vacuum where in-
creases in payroll tax and raising the age of eligibility do not exist. In 
reality, a comprehensive bill drafted for passing would include things 
of that nature, ultimately reducing the rate of benefit reductions and 
offer bipartisan compromises in order to earn the necessary votes to 
move on to the president’s desk. Here, only reductions and those to 
Part A are being proposed. 
C.  The Plan 
A proposal without a plan has no value. Political opponents will 
always oppose, but for real implementation, a proposal must persuade 
the public that it is good. With additional provisions such as raising 
payroll taxes, Medicare reform done benignly could plausibly gather 
enough bipartisan support to become law. But whether the public 
could get behind it is another matter. 
Polls and surveys show that not all voters are equal, or rather not 
all voters treat the same issues equally. In 2016, Pew Research con-
ducted a survey that showed issue importance according to age groups 
by asking registered voters whether certain issues were “very im-
portant.”103 The survey found that among the oldest voters above the 
 
 102. How to Plan for Rising Health Care Costs, FIDELITY (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.fi-
delity.com/viewpoints/personal-finance/plan-for-rising-health-care-costs. 
 103. 2016 Issue Importance by Age Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/4_3-4/.  
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age of sixty-five, 79% and 78% answered that healthcare and social 
security were very important issues, respectively.104 In contrast, of the 
eighteen to twenty-nine age group, only 57% thought that Social Se-
curity is an important issue.105 While the survey did not distinguish 
Medicare from health care generally, Medicare tends to be more 
closely associated with Social Security since both are often lumped to-
gether as entitlement programs. The youngest group of voters identi-
fied the economy, treatment of racial and ethnic minorities, and gun 
policy as the most important issues.106 
These data can be interpreted to mean that current or soon-to-be 
beneficiaries have a greater interest in Medicare and its associated ben-
efits, especially if those benefits will increase in the short-term. More-
over, the 58% eighteen to forty-nine year old voters who answered 
that Social Security is a very important issue would be less likely to 
oppose a proposal that will not personally affect them for a few dec-
ades.107 In other words, with the right message, lawmakers may be able 
to excite the voters who stand to benefit the most without alienating 
those who would not be favored by future reductions in benefits. 
The passing of ACA showed how important messaging is when 
gathering support for a new proposal. Even misleading messages such 
as, “If you like your doctor, you can keep your doctor” earned Presi-
dent Obama four Pinocchios by the Washington Post.108 This may be 
in part due to the idea that, as Jonathan Gruber—considered to be one 
of the “chief architects” of the ACA—commented, the “stupidity” of 
the American voter and the “lack of transparency” of the law were crit-
ical to its passing.109 While Gruber’s comments elicited outrage from 
Republicans, and the Obama administration and the Democratic lead-
ership distanced themselves from Gruber, there is at least some truth 
in his words.110 Many areas of law are complex and convoluted, and 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Pledge That ‘No One Will Take Away’ Your Health Plan, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/1 
0/30/obamas-pledge-that-no-one-will-take-away-your-health-plan/?utm_term=.008de85faa4e. 
 109. Annual Health Economics Conference 2013 Agenda, PENN LDI (Oct. 17, 2013), 
https://ldi.upenn.edu/ahec2013/agenda; Marc Thiessen, Thanks to Jonathan Gruber for Reveal-
ing Obamacare Deception WASH POST (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opi 
nions/marc-thiessen-thanks-to-jonathan-gruber-for-revealing-obamacare-deception/2014/11/1 
7/356514b2-6e72-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html?utm_term=.d1cd2f6d6946.  
 110. Thiessen, supra note 108. 
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health care is one of the best examples. Although lawmaking is often 
opaque, lawmakers can learn from the passing of the ACA that certain 
well intended proposals (especially initially unpopular ones) to im-
prove the general welfare can gain support by utilizing various tools 
such as opacity, persuasion, and even manipulation in some cases to 
bring about necessary changes since it is lawmakers, after all, who are 
charged with protecting and improving the general welfare, without 
regard to the political repercussions that may follow. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and 
Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds released an 
annual Report in 2017 estimating that the HI trust fund, which funds 
Part A is estimated to depleted in 2029. This is because the labor force, 
whose payroll taxes fund most of HI trust fund, will be insufficient to 
support the anticipated growth rate of enrollees to Part A as more 
Boomers reach the age of Medicare eligibility. The Trustees recom-
mend legislative changes to preserve the financial integrity of the HI 
trust fund. 
The proposal of this paper illustrates how the HI trust fund can 
reach actuarial balance in 2029 and onward solely through benefit re-
ductions by implementing either of two graduated benefit reduction 
models that mandate immediate benefit expansions in 2019, with the 
most gradual reductions possible in order to achieve actuarial balance. 
The purpose of the immediate expansion is a preemptive defense to 
political opponents who would argue that benefit reductions are hurt-
ful to beneficiaries by countering that this proposal immediately ex-
pands Part A benefits as opposed to shrinking them. 
Although additional measures such as increases in payroll taxes or 
additional transfers from general revenue could and should be included 
in a comprehensive Medicare reform bill to maintain the long-term 
viability of the HI trust fund, those measures would only serve to ame-
liorate the affect that the proposed graduated reductions would have 
on current and soon-to-be beneficiaries. Providing for those bipartisan 
measures in addition to this proposal may be a viable path for                    
a Medicare reform bill to earn the support of the public and the        
necessary congressional support for bicameralism and presentment, 
thereby protecting senior Americans into the future dependent on                         
Medicare Part A. 
Oscar Castro 
